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THE OFFICIAL
CATHOLIC DIRECTORY:
CIVIL AND CANON
LAW REQUIREMENTS
J. MICHAEL FITZGERALD*
On March 25, 1946, the Department of Treasury issued a Group Rev-
enue Ruling ("Group Ruling") to the United States Catholic Conference
("USCC"). That ruling determined that the agencies and instrumentali-
ties of all educational, charitable and religious institutions operated, su-
pervised, or controlled by or in connection with the Roman Catholic
Church in the United States, its territories or possessions, appearing in
the Official Catholic Directory ("OCD") were exempt from federal income
tax under the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to exemption from fed-
eral income tax, such entities are entitled to receive contributions which
taxpayers may deduct for purposes of federal income, estate and gift
taxes. Each year the Group Ruling is updated to reflect organizations
added to or deleted from the OCD. The USCC has delegated to each di-
ocesan bishop the responsibility of insuring that applicants for inclusion
in the OCD meet all legal requirements established by the Code and the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). Recent events give credence to the
claim that many dioceses do not adequately or effectively screen appli-
cants and that once an entity is listed, it remains listed forever despite
any changes in its status. Those events include the sale of a Catholic hos-
pital to a proprietary chain and a federal court decision that a Jesuit
sponsored university is not owned or controlled by the Church.'
* B.S., Mount St. Mary's, 1965; J.D., Catholic University, 1970; LL.M., University of
Miami, 1973; J.C.L., Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1985.
The USCC is a nonprofit membership corporation exempt from federal income tax under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, whose members include the bishops of the
Catholic Church in the United States. It is the central organization holding a group tax
exemption covering all organizations listed in the Official Catholic Directory. This group
ruling established the tax exempt status of thousands of Catholic organizations nationwide.
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops ("NCCB") is a separate, unincorporated ca-
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A brief summary of each event will provide insight to the problem:
Saint Joseph's Hospital is a 539 bed tertiary care hospital located in
Omaha, Nebraska. It was founded many years ago by the Sisters of St.
Francis of Colorado Springs. It is the primary teaching and research facil-
ity for Creighton University Health Sciences Schools of Medicine, Den-
tistry, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Allied Health.2 Creighton University is a
Jesuit institution. In 1973, the Sisters turned over control of the hospital
to a nonprofit corporation with a self-perpetuating board of trustees.
That board continued to operate the hospital as a Catholic institution.
The hospital remained a member of the Catholic Health Association and
it continued to be listed in the OCD. Recently, American Medical Inter-
national, Inc., an investor-owned multihospital chain, announced that it
would purchase the hospital for one hundred million dollars
($100,000,000.00) and that it would continue to operate the hospital in
the Catholic tradition.3
Loyola University of Chicago was alleged to have violated the civil
rights of Jerrold S. Pime, a former part-time lecturer in philosophy, by its
refusal to consider him for a full-time, tenure-track, teaching position be-
cause he was a Jew, while hiring three Catholics, all of them Jesuits."
Loyola raised two affirmative defenses. The first was that it was exempt
from the employment discrimination act 5 because it "is, in whole or in
substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particu-
lar religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society
.6 Loyola conceded that it was an employer under that act but con-
tended that the amount of money the Jesuits donated to the university
from their salaries, the number of Jesuits on the Board of Trustees, and
the role the Jesuits play in the administration of the university, estab-
lished that Loyola is supported, controlled, and managed by the Society
of Jesus, a religious order of the Catholic Church.7 Loyola raised as a sec-
ond affirmative defense the exemption found in section 703(e)(1) of Title
VII which states that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title ... it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employ-
ees . . . on the basis of their religion ... in those certain instances where
religion . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
nonical entity whose membership is the same as that of the USCC. The NCCB is exempt
from income tax under section 501(c)(3) by virtue of the USCC group ruling.
See Wall St. J., June 6, 1984, at 20.
See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1984, at D5, col. 6.
Pime v. Loyola University of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 (1982)).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(2).
Pime, 585 F. Supp. at 440.
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to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise .... 8
The Court denied the first affirmative defense because Loyola failed
to prove that it is in whole or in substantive part supported, controlled, or
managed by the Society of Jesus. In fact, after examining the corporate
charter, bylaws, and operating philosophy of the University, the Court
found just the opposite to be true.' The University is a nonprofit corpora-
tion. Its bylaws require that the president be a Jesuit and that one more
than one-third of the Board of Trustees must be Jesuits. Any amend-
ments to the bylaws must be approved by two-thirds of the trustees, a
majority of whom are men and women from various walks of life and of
various religious faiths." The principal source of Loyola's financial sup-
port is tuition fees paid by students. The Loyola Jesuit Community of
Chicago contributes 0.3 percent of Loyola's total annual revenue." That
contribution was a return of approximately twenty-five percent of salaries
which were paid by the University to its Jesuit faculty. 12 The impact of
the Society of Jesus on the management of the University was negligible:
seven percent of administrators and nine percent of full-time faculty.'2
Even though Loyola failed to prevail on the issue of religious owner-
ship/control, it did prevail on the issue of religion as a bona fide qualifica-
tion. The University had decided that it needed an adequate Jesuit pres-
ence in its philosophy department because it is a university with a Jesuit
tradition. Since the University holds itself out to the public as a Jesuit
and a Catholic University, having a Jesuit presence is important. The
Court agreed that the University had the legal right to maintain such a
presence."'
If the Board of Trustees can sell St. Joseph's Hospital, is it a Catho-
lic hospital? Is control in or by the Society of Jesus necessary for Loyola
of Chicago to be Catholic? In order to address these questions, it is neces-
sary to review the civil law pertaining to the Group Ruling as well as the
canon law pertaining to ownership and control of temporal property.
8 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e)(1).
o Pime, 585 F. Supp. at 440-41.
Id. at 437.
Id.
1I Id.
11 Id. at 440.
11 Id. at 441. Apparently Loyola and St. Joseph's relinquished control to lay boards in the
aftermath of Vatican II and in response to the McGrath thesis. McGrath proposed that once
an apostolate had been incorporated as a civil law corporation, it was no longer Church
property and was no longer subject to the canon law pertaining to administration and alien-
ation. See J. MCGRATH, CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 32-38 (1968). The
McGrath thesis has been soundly rebuked by the Holy See. See 9 J. O'CONNER, CANON LAW
DIGEST 367-71 (1983); cf. A. MAIDA & N. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES, AND
CHURCH RELATED CORPORATIONS 75-77 (1984).
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Such a review should enable us to determine whether or not those institu-
tions belong in the OCD. Since the inclusion in the OCD of an organiza-
tion that does not qualify poses a risk to all organizations included in the
Group Ruling, improper supervision and control of the process could have
disastrous consequences for the Church in America.
In order to qualify for inclusion in the Group Ruling, an organization
must be both organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, . . . literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or indi-
vidual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, . . . and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or dis-
tributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candi-
date for public office. 5 In order for an organization to be tax exempt, the
organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for one or
more of the purposes specified in Section 501(c)(3).16 Those requirements
are known as the organizational test and the operational test. If an *organ-
ization fails to meet either test, it is not exempt under Section 501(c)(3)."7
The organizational test provides that any organization included in
the Group Ruling, with the exception of those recognized as exempt prior
to July 27, 1959, must be a legal entity with an organizational document
that meets certain specific requirements. The term "organizing docu-
ment" refers to an organization's articles of incorporation, its trust instru-
ment, corporate charter, articles of association, or any other written docu-
ment by which the organization is created. The organizational test must
be met by reference to the organizing document and a defect in the or-
ganizing document may not be remedied in the bylaws.
The specific requirements that must be included in the organizing
document relate to the purposes of the organization and the dissolution
of the organization. The organization's purpose must be limited to one or
more of the purposes recognized under Section 501(c)(3), and it must not
be expressly empowered to engage in, except as an insubstantial part of
its activities, activities which are themselves not in furtherance of an ex-
11 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
'6 Id. The term "charitable" is interpreted in its generally accepted legal sense, and includes
relief of the poor, distressed or underprivileged; promotion of health; advancement of reli-
gion, education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments or
works; lessening the burdens of government; promotion of social welfare by organizations
designed to accomplish any of the above purposes or to lessen neighborhood tension; elimi-
nation of prejudice and discrimination; defense of human and civil rights secured by law;
and combatting community deterioration and juvenile delinquency. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)
(3)-l(d) (2) (1959). The term "religious" is not so defined but has been broadly interpreted
by the courts. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (1959).
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empt purpose. Further, the organization's assets must be permanently
dedicated to exempt purposes. The organizing document must provide
that upon the dissolution or termination of the organization, its assets
will be distributed to another organization which is exempt within the
meaning of section 501(c)(3)." s
An organization included in the Group Ruling must also meet an op-
erational test. In order to meet that test, the organization must be oper-
ated exclusively for exempt purposes. An organization will be regarded as
"operated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages
primarily in activities which accomplish one or more exempt purposes.
However, if more than an insubstantial part of its activities are not in
furtherance of exempt purposes, it will not meet the operational test. 9
An organization may meet the requirements of the operational test and
qualify for inclusion in the Group Ruling even though a substantial part
of its activities is the operation of a trade or business, provided that the
trade or business is directly related to the accomplishment of its exempt
purposes.2 0
In order to satisfy the operational test, an organization must be en-
gaged in activities that further public purposes rather than private inter-
ests. The organization must not be operated for the benefit of designated
individuals, its creators or their families, or shareholders. 2' In addition,
both the Code and regulations expressly prohibit inurement of an organi-
zation's net earnings to the benefit of private shareholders or individu-
als.2 2 Stated simply, an organization's trustees, officers, members, foun-
ders, contributors or other interested individuals may not receive the
benefit of its funds except in the form of reasonable compensation. Inure-
ment may take many forms including excessive compensation, favorable
loans, rent or other financial arrangements, and provision of goods and
services.23
An organization will not meet the requirements of the operational
test if more than an insubstantial part of its activities consists of at-
tempts to influence legislation. Such attempts include contacting, or urg-
ing the public to contact, members of a legislative body for purposes of
proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation.2 ' The term "legislation"
includes action by the Congress, any state legislature, any local governing
"S Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1959); Rev. Proc. 82-2, 1982-1 C.B. 367.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (1959).
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1) (1959).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(1) (ii) (1959).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (1959).
" John Marshall Law School v. United States, 81-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9514 (Ct. Cl.
1981); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1200-02 (Ct. Cl.
1969); Parshall Christian Order, 1983 T.C.M. (P-H) V 83,011 (T.C. 1983).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (ii) (1959).
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body, or by the public in a referendum or initiative.2" Attempts to influ-
ence legislation include both direct lobbying of legislators and attempts to
influence public opinion on legislative issues. 26 However, testimony in re-
sponse to a written invitation by congressional committees 2 and distribu-
tion to the public of results of nonpartisan analysis, study and research
are not considered attempts to influence legislation.2 8 There is little clar-
ity as to what constitutes more than insubstantial legislative activity. One
case held that less than five percent of the organization's time and effort
was not insubstantial; 29 whereas another held that about seventeen per-
cent was substantial.3 One court rejected a percentage test formula to
determine "substantiality" and applied a test requiring a balancing of the
organization's activities in relation to its objectives and circumstances in
order to determine whether a "substantial" part of its activities was in-
tended to influence legislation.3 1
In order to meet the operational test, an organization may not inter-
vene or participate in political campaigns on behalf of candidates for pub-
lic office. Such participation is not limited to publishing or distributing
statements or making oral statements supporting or opposing candidates
for public office. In addition, exempt organizations may not participate in
or support, financially or otherwise, political action committees or engage
in biased voter education polls or questionnaires. 32
Occasionally an organization operated for the primary purpose of
carrying on a trade or business for profit seeks to qualify as an exempt
organization on the basis that it pays all its income to one or more ex-
empt organizations ("feeder organizations"). The Code does not allow tax
exemption status to such feeder organizations except in narrowly speci-
fied instances. 3
Subsidiaries of exempt organizations are not exempt from tax if they
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1959).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1959).
$7 Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-72 C.B. 111.
Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138.
" Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955).
30 Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1146-47 (Ct. Cl. 1974)(per curiam), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
S Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1959); Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(g)(1980); Rev. Rul. 80-
282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Hammerstein v. Kelley, 235 F.
Supp. 60, 64-65 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965).
33 I.R.C. § 502 (1985); Treas. Reg. 1.502-1 (1958). In order to obtain tax exempt status the
feeder organization must: (1) have substantially all of its work performed by unpaid workers
or volunteers, (2) sell mostly contributed merchandise (e.g., thrift shop), or (3) derive its
income in the form of rent, provided the rent is not subject to unrelated trade or business.
I.R.C. § 502 (1985).
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carry on businesses that would be unrelated trade or business if carried
on by the parent organization. Similarly, exemption is also not allowed to
an organization owned by several unrelated exempt organizations which
provides services to the parent organizations, since such services would
typically constitute an unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on
by any one of the tax-exempt organizations. 4
Organizations described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Code are divided
into two subcategories-those that are private foundations and those that
are public charities. A private foundation may not be included in the
OCD. Every organization described in Section 501(c)(3) is considered to
be a private foundation except organizations which are described in sub-
divisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Section 509(a) of the Code. Only the first three
subdivisions are relevant to this topic. Set forth below is a brief summary
of the chief methods by which an organization may avoid classification as
a private foundation, including qualification for church, school, or hospi-
tal status, and under various support tests:
I. Organizations described in Section 509(a)(1) of the Code are public
charities. Section 509(a)(1) operates by reference to six subdivisions of
Section 170(b)(1)(A) and provides that organizations described therein
are not private foundations. Only four of those subdivisions are relevant
here. They are churches and conventions of churches, educational organi-
zations, hospitals and medical research organizations, and publicly-sup-
ported organizations. 8 We shall review each one in order:
1. Churches and Conventions of Churches. Neither the Code nor
the regulations specifically define the term "church".36 Further, Congress
and the courts have provided little guidance in this respect. In one case,
the court stated "[tlo exempt churches, one must know what a church is.
Congress must either define 'church' or leave the definition to the com-
mon meaning and usage of the word; otherwise, Congress would be unable
to exempt churches. '3 7 The IRS generally applies a fourteen-point test in
determining an organization's status as a church.38 An organization not
34 I.R.C. § 502 (1985); Treas. Reg. § 1.502- l(b) (1958); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,003 (June 24,
1983).
36 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1985).
" I.R.C. § § 509(a) (1) and 170(b) (1) (A) (i); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(a); See also Whelan,
"Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
885 (1977).
17 De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891, 903 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
3 (CCH) Internal Revenue Manual Vol. 4 § 7(10)69-321.3(3). The fourteen point test is as
follows: (1) a distinct legal existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of worship; (3) a defi-
nite and distinct ecclesiastical government; (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a
distinct religious history; (6) a membership not associated with any other church or denomi-
nation; (7) ordained ministers ministering to the congregation; (8) ordained ministers se-
lected after completing the prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established
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satisfying all fourteen criteria would not necessarily be denied status as a
church. However, an organization satisfying only one or two of these cri-
teria may have a difficult time establishing its claim to church status.3" At
a minimum, a church must include a body of believers who assemble reg-
ularly for worship and must be reasonably available to the public in its
conduct of worship, educational instruction, and promulgation of doc-
trine." An organization can qualify as a religious organization under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) but nonetheless fail to qualify as a church under Section170(b)(1)(A) (i).41
The term "convention or association of churches" generally refers to
the central convention of a group of churches or to an association of
churches of different denominations. Thus, an organization whose mem-
bership consists of churches of various denominations would qualify as an
association of churches.
42
2. Educational Organizations. An educational organization is defined
as one whose primary function is the presentation of formal instruction
and which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and nor-
mally has a regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at
the place where its educational activities are regularly carried on.43 In-
cluded in this category are private and public elementary, secondary, and
preparatory or high schools, colleges, universities and various other in-
structional institutions." It does not include organizations engaged in
both educational and noneducational activities unless the latter are
merely incidental to the educational activities. For example, an organiza-
tion that primarily engages in medical research and also offers limited
instruction to doctors would not be considered an educational organiza-
tion. 45 Likewise, the IRS has ruled that a correspondence school which
places of worship; (11) regular congregations; (12) regular religious services; (13) schools for
religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools for the preparation of its ministers. Id.
" See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1954); see also Whelan, "Church" in the
Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (1977); "Diffi-
cult Definitional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion and Race," BNA, Daily Execu-
tive Report, Jan. 11, 1977.
" Pusch v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 80,004, aff'd mem., 628 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980);
American Guidance Foundation v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11 Church of the Visible Intelligence v. United States, 83-2 U.S.T.C. 9726 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
4' Rev. Rul. 74-224, 1974-1 C.B. 61.
43 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1985).
14 Tax exempt status is denied to those educational organizations which have racially dis-
criminating policies because such policies conflict with the fundamental public policy and
common law of the United States. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983); Rev. Rul. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587; Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul. 71-
447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-443, 1958-2 C.B. 102 (numismatic society which primarily collects and
preserves coins, and secondarily provides facilities for study, not an educational
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also offers a five-to-ten-day seminar is not an educational organization.4"
It is important to note that an organization may qualify as educational
under Section 501(c)(3) but not under the more restrictive standards of
Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).' 7
3. Hospitals and Medical Research Organizations. To be classified as
a hospital, an organization's principal function must be the provision of
medical care.4 8 The term "medical care" is defined as "the treatment of
any physical or mental disability or condition, whether on an inpatient or
outpatient basis."4 9 A rehabilitation institute, mental health facility, drug
treatment center, or extended-care facility may qualify as a hospital if its
principal function is the provision of medical care. The term "hospital"
does not include homes for children, the aged"0 or convalescents, voca-
tional training facilities for the handicapped, or organizations providing
health care services to patients in their own homes."
To qualify as a medical research organization, an organization's prin-
cipal function must be medical research, and it must be directly engaged
in the continuous active conduct of medical research in conjunction with
a hospital. 2 Such an organization must either devote a substantial part of
its assets to medical research, or spend a significant percentage of its en-
dowment for that purpose. An organization that merely disburses funds
to other organizations in support of their research, or makes grants or
scholarships to individuals, is not a medical research organization. 3
organization).
" Rev. Rul. 75-492, 1975-2 C.B. 80.
17 I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(ii); Treas.Reg. § 1.170A-9(b)(1).
'8 Hospitals present particular concerns. If a hospital reorganization results in the formation
of a property holding corporation, that entity may not be eligible for inclusion as it could be
considered a section 501(c)(2) organization. A hospital foundation should not be included if
it is a private foundation. Hospital cooperative service organizations providing services not
specifically enumerated in § 501(e) do not qualify. See HCSC -Laundry v. United States,
450 U.S. 1 (1981)(per curiam).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(1)(1972).
0 HUD housing programs for the elderly do not automatically qualify for exemption. A
home for the aged will qualify for tax exempt status if it is operated in a manner designed to
satisfy some combination of the special needs of the elderly recognized by the IRS: housing,
health care, and financial security. The need for housing is met if the home provides facili-
ties designed to meet the physical, emotional, recreational, social, and religious or similar
needs of the elderly. The need for health care is met if the home directly provides a form of
health care or maintains a continuing agreement with other organizations to meet the physi-
cal or mental health needs of the residents. The need for financial security is met if the
home is committed to an established policy of maintaining in residence those who become
unable to pay and if it provides services to the elderly at the lowest possible cost. Rev. Rul.
72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145; Rev. Rul. 79-19, 1979-1 C.B. 195; Rev. Rul. 79-18, 1979-1 C.B. 194.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(1)(1972).
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(2)(i)(1972).
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(2)(v)(c) (1972).
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There need not be any formal affiliation between the medical research
organization and the hospital. It is sufficient that there be a joint effort
and continued close cooperation between the two organizations.
4. Publicly-Supported Organizations. Organizations that are publicly
supported normally must receive at least one-third of their total support
from governmental units or from direct or indirect contributions from the
general public. "Support" does not include amounts derived from capital
gains or the performance of exempt functions. The term "normally" gen-
erally refers to a four-year computation period.5
II. Organizations described in section 509(a)(2) are public charities.
Such an organization must normally receive more than one-third of its
support from any combination of 1) gifts, grants, contributions or mem-
bership fees; and 2) gross receipts from its admissions, sales or merchan-
dise, performance of services, or furnishing facilities in the performance
of its exempt functions. In addition, it normally must not receive more
than one-third of its support from gross investment income, and the
amount of taxable unrelated business income in excess of taxes imposed
by Section 511.'6
5' I.R.C. § § 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A) (iii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(c)(2)(vii); Rev. Rul. 76-416,
1976-2 C.B. 57.
"' I.R.C. § § 509(a)(1), 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(e); Rev. Rul. 83-153,
1983-2 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 78-95, 1978-1 C.B. 71; Rev. Rul. 77-255, 1977-2 C.B. 74. To deter-
mine whether an organization is publicly supported under this section, it is necessary to
compute its public support fraction. The denominator of the public support fraction in-
cludes the organization's total support from any combination of gifts, grants, contributions,
and membership fees from the general public and from governmental units. However, to the
extent a single donor's contribution exceeds two percent of the organization's total support,
it must be excluded from the numerator of the public support fraction. Rev. Rul. 78-95,
1978-1 C.B. 71. The entire amount of such contribution is included in the denominator of
the fraction. Id. The two percent limitation does not apply to contributions from section
170(b)(1)(A) (vi) organizations, governmental units, and other organizations that normally
receive a substantial part of their support from public contributions. Id. It does apply, how-
ever, to support received from business leagues exempt from tax under section 501(c)(6) of
the code.
6 I.R.C. § 509(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3. The denominator of an organization's support
fraction is its total support for the year. Support from disqualified persons may not be in-
cluded in the numerator of the support fraction. In addition, gross receipts from exempt
activities may be included in the numerator only to the extent that the amount received
from a single source, other than organizations described in section 509(a)(1), does not ex-
ceed the greater of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) or one percent of the organization's
total support in the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-3(b)(1), 1.509(a)-3(j). If an organiza-
tion is described both in sections 509(a)(1) and 509(a)(2), it will be treated under section
509(a)(1). I.R.C. § 509(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.509 (a)-(3). Disqualified persons are defined in
section 4946(a)(1) of the Code and include substantial contributors (any person who con-
tributes more than $5,000.00, if such amount is more than two percent of the total contribu-
tions of the organization for the year of the contribution) and foundation managers. In addi-
tion, government officials, certain family members, corporations, partnerships, trusts,
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III. Organizations described in section 509(a)(3) are public chari-
ties.5" Unlike the provisions of section 509(a)(1) and (2) discussed above,
which except organizations from private foundation status based upon
their institutional nature or sources of support, section 509(a)(3) excepts
organizations on the basis of their relationship to other organizations
which are themselves described in sections 509(a)(1) or (2).58 They are
thus known as supporting organizations. A supporting organization is not
treated as a private foundation on the theory that it is indirectly respon-
sible to the public by reason of its relationship to a publicly-supported
organization. Examples would include an organization operated for the
benefit of and controlled by a religious order, a trust operated for the
benefit of and controlled by a school, or a university press.59
estates, and private foundations are also excluded. See I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1)(C).
To qualify as an organization described in Section 509(a)(3), an organization must be:
A. [Ojrganized and at all times thereafter is operated, exclusively for the benefit of, to
perform the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more specified organi-
zations described in paragraphs (1) or (2) [of section 509]; B. .. operated, supervised
or controlled by or in connection with one or more organizations described in
paragraphs (1) or (2); and C. . . . not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more
disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) other than foundation managers and
other than one or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2).
I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
I8 d.
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g). With respect to the first criterion, the supported organization
should be specifically identified in the organizing document of the supporting organization.
For purposes of the third criterion, an organization will be considered controlled directly or
indirectly by disqualified persons if such persons possess fifty percent or more of the voting
power of the organization's governing body or if one or more disqualified persons has a veto
power over the actions of the organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(A)-4(J); Rev. Rul. 80-207,
1980-2 C.B. 193. The relationships required by the second criterion comprise a substantial
part of the regulations under section 509(a)(3) and probably will cause the greatest difficulty
with respect to inclusion in the OCD.
The relationship styled as "operated, supervised or controlled by" is comparable to a
parent-subsidiary relationship. Treas. Reg. § § 1.509(a)-4(f)(4), 1.509(a)-(g)(l)(i). The rela-
tionship is established through the election or appointment of a majority of the organiza-
tion's officers, directors, or trustees by the governing body, members of the governing body,
officers or membership of the supported organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1); Rev.
Rul. 75-436, 1975-2 C.B. 217. The relationship styled as "supervised or controlled in connec-
tion with" requires common supervision or control of the supporting organization and the
supported organization. It is established if the control or management of the supporting
organization is vested in the same individuals that control or manage the supported organi-
zation so as to insure that the supporting organization will be responsive to the needs and
requirements of the supported organizations. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(4).
The relationship styled as "operated in connection with" is the most complex of the
three relationships identified in section 509(a)(3). Such an organization must meet both a
responsiveness test and an integral part test. If it fails to meet either of those tests, it is not
"operated in connection with." Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(1).
The responsiveness test provides that the supported organization must have a signifi-
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The Group Ruling covers the agencies, instrumentalities, and all edu-
cational, "charitable and religious institutions operated, supervised, or
controlled by or in connection with the Roman Catholic Church" in the
United States. This defines the relationship with the Church necessary
for inclusion in the OCD. This relationship has never been defined by the
IRS nor has the USCC ever sought such a definition. The language "oper-
ated, supervised, or controlled by or in connection with" mirrors the lan-
guage of section 509(a)(3)(B) of the Code and is strikingly similar to the
language of the Employment Discrimination Act. Clearly an organization
meeting the requirements of section 509(a)(3) with respect to another
church entity (for example a diocese, parish, or religious order) is eligible
for inclusion in the OCD. However, what about the university or hospital
that is sponsored by a religious community but is operated by a lay
board? A review of church law pertaining to ownership and control will
provide some light on the subject.
Various ecclesiologies define what is "church." It has been styled at
various times as a Perfect Society, the Mystical Body of Christ, the Peo-
cant voice in the supporting organization's policies. (This may be accomplished in one of
three ways; namely: one or more of the officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting or-
ganization is elected or appointed by the supported organization; one or more members of
the governing body of the supported organization serves as a principal officer of the support-
ing organization; or the officers, directors, or trustees of the supporting organization other-
wise maintain a close and continuing relationship with their counterparts in the supported
organization.) The significant voice must apply to all aspects of the supporting organiza-
tion's policies and activities, including investment policies, timing and manner of making
grants, selection of r~cipients, and directing the use of income or assets. The IRS has ruled
that representation on the supporting organization's grant selection committee does not es-
tablish significant voice if an independent trustee has sole and complete authority over all
other aspects of the supporting organization's administration. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-
4(i)(2)(ii).
Organizations that are charitable trusts under state law are excepted from the signifi-
cant voice requirements. If the supported organization has the power to enforce the trust
and to compel an accounting, the supporting organization will meet the responsiveness test.
Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(2)(ii); Rev. Rul. 75-437, 1975-2 C.B. 218.
The integral part test has as its underlying objective to insure that the supporting or-
ganization maintains significant involvement in the operation of the supported organization
and that the supported organization is dependent upon the supporting organization for the
type of support it provides. This test may be met in one of two ways. The first requires the
supporting organization to conduct activities that carry out the purposes of or that perform
the functions of the supported organization. These activities must be of the type that would
normally be carried on by the supported organization. The second requires the supporting
organization to pay substantially all (generally at least eighty five percent) of its income to
or for the use of the supported organization. This must be sufficient to insure the supported
organization's attentiveness to the operations of the supporting organization. Sufficiency of
support is a matter determined on the basis of all relevant facts and circumstances. Treas.
Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(3); Rev. Rul. 76-208, 1976-1 C.B. 161.
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ple of God, Servant or Healer, Sacrament, and Herald."' Thus, under
some ecclesiologies, Catholic lay organizations are "supervised or con-
trolled in connection with" or "operated in connection with the Roman
Catholic Church." However, as a theology, ecclesiology is not accepted by
the courts of the United States because to do so would violate the Consti-
tution.61 However, the canon law does set forth when an organization is
"supervised or controlled in connection with the church." Since the civil
courts may apply the canon law without violating the Constitution,"' a
review of canonical principles is in order.
Unlike American civil law, which is a compendium of duties and obli-
gations with appropriate sanctions for violations, canon law contains
proclamations of Christian faith, doctrinal statements, theological opin-
ions, statements concerning moral values, philosophical theories, concepts
as well as rules of conduct. Canon law finds its inspiration in the doctrine
of the Church and not the contrary, which was sometimes the impression
given in earlier centuries when doctrine at times appeared to be derived
from, rather than serving as the basis for, legislative enactments. Thus, to
understand Canon law, one must first examine Church doctrine. The ba-
sic teaching underlying the law is that it is written for the people of God
who are gathered together in ecclesial communion. Their union arises
from baptism, from a desire to give witness to Christ, and from unity in
faith, sacraments and discipline.6" Those members of the Church who are
in full communion with it are called on to share in the threefold mission
of Christ himself: to teach, to sanctify and to govern."4 It is, thus, the
Church and its members that are regulated by canon law.
Canon law is necessary for the proper functioning of the Church.
Since the Church is established as a social and visible structure, it must
have norms. The reasons for the necessity of such norms are many and
diverse: so that its hierarchical and organic structure will be visible; so
that the exercise of the functions divinely entrusted to it, especially that
of sacred power and of the administration of the sacraments, may be ade-
quately organized; so that the mutual relations of the faithful may be
regulated according to justice based on charity, with the rights of the in-
dividuals guaranteed and well-defined; and finally, so that the common
initiatives undertaken to live a Christian life even more perfectly may be
sustained, strengthened, and fostered.6 5
60 A. DULLES, MODELS OF THE CHURCH 25 (1974).
61 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-10 (1979); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 119-21 (1952).
62 See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1929).
61 1983 CODE c. 205.
" Id. at c. 204.
66 THE POPE SPEAKS, Vol. 29 No. 4 (1984), 343
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The canon law includes rules relating to the structure and purpose of
church organizations. A juridic person in canon law is akin to a corpora-
tion in American civil law. A corporation is an artificial being, created by
civil law and endowed with certain rights and powers. A corporation ex-
ists in the eyes of the civil law as separate from the physical persons who
own, control and/or operate it. A juridic person is also an artificial being,
but is created by canon law and endowed with certain rights and respon-
sibilities of its own. It is an aggregate of persons or things and has a mis-
sion or work of the Church as its purpose.66
The concept of juridic persons includes both private juridic persons,
such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society, and public juridic persons such
as dioceses, parishes and religious institutes. A public juridic person67 can
be an aggregate of natural physical persons or an aggregate of things. If it
is an aggregate of persons, it can be collegial or noncollegial. A diocese or
parish is a noncollegial public juridic person since its members do not
elect the bishop or pastor or guide its affairs as directly as members of a
religious institute." A religious institute, however, is a collegial public ju-
ridic person since its members participate in the institute by means of
electing superiors, chapter delegates and council members to direct the
affairs of the institute." This paper concerns only the activities of public
juridic persons. Therefore, all reference to juridic persons should be un-
derstood to apply to public juridic persons.
A public juridic person may be brought into existence by operation of
the law itself or by a decree of the competent Church authority. Most
public juridic persons are created by operation of the law itself, such as a
diocese, a parish or a religious institute. Upon the creation of the diocese
or parish, the public juridic person is automatically brought into exis-
tence by operation of law.7" However, there are also other public juridic
persons which are brought into existence by special decree. 7 An example
of such special creation would be the Catholic University of America,
which was established by a decree of the Holy See. The creation of public
juridic persons under canon law is analogous to the creation of corpora-
tions under American civil law.
All property which belongs to the Universal Church, the Apostolic
See, or other public juridic persons within the Church is Church property
" 1983 CODE C. 116.
" A private juridic person is a rare and little used entity in the American Church. It can
only be created by ecclesiastical decree and can not act in the name of the Church. The St.
Vincent de Paul Society is an example of a private juridic person. Id.
" 1983 CODE cc. 146-185.
" Id. at cc. 164-179.
70 Id.
"' Id. at c. 1257, § 1.
CIVIL AND CANON LAW REQUIREMENTS
and is regulated by the canon law.72 Property might be generally classi-
fied as spiritual or temporal. This paper concerns the temporal property,
and all references to property herein should be so understood. Histori-
cally, Church property has been divided into three types 1) corporeal or
incorporeal; 2) movable or immovable; and 3) stable or free. The new
Code of Canon Law uses such terms without definition. However, many of
such terms were defined in the 1917 Code" and such definitions are help-
ful in today's understanding.
74
Corporeal property is tangible property; property which can be seen
or touched such as land and buildings. Incorporeal property is intangible
property; property which can not be perceived by the senses such as con-
tract rights, copyrights, stocks and bonds. Movable property is that which
can be moved from place to place such as furniture and supplies. Immov-
able property is that which cannot be moved from place to place such as
land, buildings and permanent fixtures. Stable property is property that
has been assigned to a specific purpose by its donor or by competent ec-
clesiastical authority. Property not so assigned is considered free.
The Church has the legal right to own property under both civil law
and canon law. The legal right to own property under canon law is tem-
pered by the teachings of Vatican II concerning the general purpose of
Church property. The conciliar orientation can be summarized this way:
The property of this world has a goodness that derives from the Cre-
ator and is a necessary means for the realization of a person's vocation.
However, property is viewed with a certain suspicion because of the dan-
gers it contains, dangers from which the property can and must be freed
by putting it at the service of society and communion.7 5 Private property
is legitimate and makes room for the exercise of the individual's freedom.
But private property must not be transformed into a cause of greed, and
one must not forget that its primary social function is support for the
clergy, charity, and the exercise of works of the apostolate.
The Church asserts its right to acquire, to hold and to administer
property for the attainment of the purposes for which the Church was
founded. Those purposes are 1) the organization of divine worship; 2) the
provision of decent support for the clergy; 3) the exercise of works of the
apostolate; and 4) for general charity, especially for the benefit of those in
need.76 The right to and the purpose of ownership of property was recog-
72 1917 CODE c. 1497.
" 1983 CODE c. 21.
7' Gaudium et Spes, n.69. [hereinafter G.S.].
75 Council of Antioch, can. 25: Mansi 2, 1327; Decree of Gratian, c. 23, C. 12, q. I (ed.
Friedberg, I, pp. 684-685).
76 Presbyterorium Ordinis, n. 17 [hereinafter P.O.].
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nized in the early Church was reaffirmed by Vatican I" and has been
codified in canon law."8 Further, those purposes of property ownership
have been further reaffirmed and specified as the right to exercise the
works of mercy or charity, 9 as a right flowing from religious liberty,80 as
the right to set up schools8 1 and the right to use the means of communi-
cation. 82 Finally, the Church recognizes a wide spectrum of works that
pertain to the apostolate: promoting the perfection of Christian life,
works of divine worship, evangelization, teaching, spiritual works of
mercy including health care, and efforts to make the world better. 3
Church property may only be owned by the Universal Church, the
Apostolic See or another public juridic person within the Church.8" All
such entities are capable of acquiring, retaining, administering and alien-
ating Church property.85 Thus, a religious institute, as a public juridic
person may own Church property. A private juridic person may not own
church property.
Canon law does not prescribe what form of entity must be used for
the ownership of Church property. Nor does canon law restrict the type
of entity that may be used for the ownership of Church property. Rather
canon law simply provides that the civil law of the jurisdiction where the
property is located must be observed unless it is contrary to divine law or
unless canon law makes some more specific provision.86 Since canon law
does not make any specific provision for the manner in which title to
Church property is to be held or administered, other than requiring that
it be safeguarded by civilly valid means, the administrators of Church
property in the United States may choose from among a wide variety of
civilly valid methods and are directed to choose the particular methods or
entity type deemed best suited to the particular business enterprise
under consideration.
The Code contains many norms relating to the administration of
Church property, but the overall guiding principle rests on the purpose
for which the Church may own property. One does not find in the Code a
single doctrinal enunciation on the meaning of property in general or of
the Church's property in particular. However, it is not hard to identify
the various norms that have inserted the directives of Vatican II into the
7 1983 CODE CC. 1254, § 2; 222, § 1; 114, § 2.
78 G.S., n. 42; P.O., n. 17.
7' Dignitatis Humanae, n. 4 [hereinafter D.H.].
SO Gravissimum Educationes, n. 8 [hereinafter G.E.].
" Inter Mirifica, n. 3 [hereinafter I.M.].
8" 1983 CODE c. 298, § 1.
83 Id. at cc. 1256-1259.
Id. at c. 1255.
86 Id. at c. 1284.
86 Id. at c. 1254.
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fabric of the law. Thus from the very first canon of Book V, the Code
strongly underscores the purpose of Church property," that the right to
possess property by persons in the Church derives from their sharing in
the Church's mission8s and that the administration of Church property
must be consistent therewith. Since public juridic persons have the right
to possess Church property because they share in the Church's mission,
they must abide by the Church's laws and act in her spirit, in communion
with and under the supervision of the hierarchy, especially the Holy See.
In this light, we can sense the spirit underlying the administration of
Church property, a spirit which is not so much to accumulate property as
to present the image of a poor Church, a spirit that uses Church property
for the purposes of the Church and in the spirit of the gospel.8 8
The basic teaching underlying the law is that it is written for the
people of God, who are gathered together in ecclesial communion; their
union arises from baptism, from a desire to give witness to Christ, and
from unity in faith, sacraments, and discipline.90 Those members of the
Church who are in full communion with it are called on to share in the
threefold mission of Christ himself: to teach, to sanctify, and to govern.91
The property of the Church is at the service of this triple mission. It is
justified by it and finds its source in ecclesial communion. Anything that
disturbs or jeopardizes ecclesial communion must be avoided.
Church property is to be applied always to the purposes for which
the Church is allowed to 6wn property: the organization of divine wor-
ship, the provision of decent support for the clergy, and the exercise of
works of the apostolate and of charity, especially for the benefit of those
in need.92
God destined the earth and all it contains for all people, and all cre-
ated things are to be shared fairly by all mankind under the guidance of
justice, tempered by charity. The Church recognizes that the structure of
property will be different according to changing custom and changing cir-
cumstances. However, such structures will not alter the universal destina-
tion of earthly property. 3
Every public juridic person has a canonically recognized administra-"
tor who is charged with overseeing that public juridic person's affairs and
8 Id. at cc. 1255-1257.
98 Id. at cc. 222, § 1; 1254.
81 Id. at c. 205.
1* Id. at c. 204.
P.O., n. 17.
G.S., n. 69.
" 1983 CODE C. 118. For example, a bishop is the administrator of a diocese, a pastor is that
for a parish, superior generals and councils for religious institutes,provincial superiors and
councils for provinces of religious institutes.
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managing its property."4 Since the property of the public juridic person is
Church property, the administrator acts in the name of the Church. The
administrator must manage the property for the benefit of the Church
and its mission. The administrator is accountable to the Church for that
administration. The law on administration of Church property is
designed to implement that notion of accountability by establishing cer-
tain minimum requirements which, if maintained, will insure that Church
property is used only for Church purposes. When any public juridic per-
son sponsors an apostolate such as a college, nursing home, or hospital,
the proper canonical administrator of the sponsored institution is the
same as that for the sponsoring public juridic person.95
The relationship of the canonical administrator to the public juridic
person has been described as one of stewardship. The notion of steward-
ship contains three important and pertinent concepts. First, it connotes
the fiduciary relationship that the administrator has toward the public
juridic person. The steward is in a position of trust. The second concept
is the idea of beneficial ownership. Property held by the steward is not
his own. The steward must hold, manage and make the best of the prop-
erty for the true owner. Finally, stewardship connotes that the steward
has been charged by a higher authority to look after the affairs of some-
one who can not do so for himself.
Administration of property may also be compared to the government
of persons. Just as the proper function of government is the preservation
of the well-being of persons in order to help them to their proper end in
life, so the administration of property consists in preserving all things
which have been acquired and using them for their destined end. This
function comprises three things:
1. The preservation and improvement of property which has been
acquired;
2. The natural or artificial production of, fruits or income (i.e., prof-
its) from such property; and
3. The useful application of such profits to proper purposes.
The right of administration flows from the right to own property.
The right of ownership includes the right to use, enjoy, and dispose of
property, all of which imply acts of administration. All Church property
is held "in trust" by public juridic persons, who are represented by physi-
cal persons, the administrators of such property.
The word "steward" used in the English translations of the Code has
a special sense today as "responsible stewardship." Moreover, as persons,
the administrators are not beneficial owners, but are entrusted with a
94 A. MAIDA & N.P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES, AND CHURCH RELATED
CORPORATIONS 41 (1984).
95 Luke 12:42; Matt. 24:45.
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special responsibility on behalf of the Church community.
Canon 1284 refers indirectly to the notion of "steward" when it uses
the word "householder." All administrators are to perform their duties
with the diligence of a good householder. The Code establishes very clear
duties for canonical administrators regarding their administration of
property.96
" The duties for canonical administrators are:
1. The administrator, before taking office, must take an oath before the diocesan bishop or
other religious superior, that he will act efficiently and faithfully in his management of the
public juridic person's possessions.
2. The administrator, before taking office, must make an accurate and detailed inventory
listing the possessions of the public juridic person, including both real and personal prop-
erty, precious items and items of cultural or historic value.
3. The administrator must take care that none of the property owned by the public juridic
person is in any way irrevocably lost or damaged. Thus, proper insurance contracts should
be arranged. Such insurance policies should, if possible, cover the replacement value of
Church property when buildings, etc., are under consideration. The Code does not prescribe
any particular type of insurance, it merely outlines the principle.
4. The administrator must insure that the ownership of the property of the public juridic
person is protected through civilly valid methods. The civil ownership is considered as a
means of protecting canonical ownership. Among such items are verification of land titles,
incorporation and registration of certain funds.
5. The administrator must observe the requirements of the canon law and the civil law and
those requirements imposed by the founder or donor of Church property. In particular, ad-
ministrators are to take special care that damage will not be suffered by the Church through
the nonobservance of the civil law. The Code does not refer to the type of damage. It could
be material or it could be otherwise, such as reputation. The requirements include, but are
not limited to, the observation of labor laws, payment of the required taxes, not giving false
tax donation receipts, etc.
6. The administrator must collect accurately any income generated by the property of the
public juridic person as such income is due. This could be accomplished by investing funds
in accounts that produce a reasonable rate of return while avoiding excess profits, e.g., the
avoidance of usury.
7. The administrator must pay on time all loans or mortgages taken out by a public juridic
person. That includes both principal and interest. Usually 20-25 years is considered a long
time to maintain a debt.
8. The administrator must invest profitably excess funds beyond those required to meet the
public juridic person's current expenses.
9. The administrator must keep well-ordered books of receipts and expenditures of the pub-
lic juridic person. This would mean keeping honest and accurate accounts and certainly not
having duplicitous sets of books.
10. The administrator must prepare annual reports on the administration of the public ju-
ridic person's property and affairs.
11. The administrator must arrange and keep in a safe place all legal documents that confer
property rights on the public juridic person. The requirement is to keep suitable archives
but not necessarily or exclusively in the place of business. In the United States, every
county has a public registry of deeds for real property or interest in real property and the
duty may be met by proper public recording, at least concerning interest in real estate.
Where intangible property rights are created by contract, the contractual documents are to
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In addition, administrators are to be very careful to observe the prin-
ciples of social justice in carrying out their administration in matters of
contract (observing civil laws relating to labor and social life) and in mat-
ters of equitable wages. 7 Further, the administrator is required to comply
with the canon law pertaining to alienation of property. Even though the
canon law treats the administration of property and the alienation of
property in separate sections of the Code, the obligations imposed on an
administrator include the requirement to comply with the law on
alienation.
The canon law regulating the administration of Church property is
applicable to all property which belongs to any public juridic person. The
law attaches to the property itself.
The concept of alienation is generally thought of as involving a con-
veyance of Church property to another party.98 However, in addition to
be kept safely.
The last nine of the foregoing eleven requirements are little different than the require-
ments imposed by law on the directors of an American civil law corporation. The canonical
administrator of the property of a public juridic person is similarly accountable for his ad-
ministration. This view of an administrator's accountability was developed as part of the
Vatican II ecclesiology and has now been codified.
1983 CODE C. 1257.
" A number of acts are considered to be alienation for canon law purposes:
1. Any act by which title to the Church's real property, which is part of the stable patrimony
of a public juridic person, is transferred to another party.
2. Any spending of all or a part of Church property which is part of the stable patrimony of
a public juridic person, other than for the purpose for which such property was dedicated
(i.e., the spending of immobilized funds for some purpose other than that for which they
were immobilized) such as:
(a) the spending of funds of a public juridic person beyond the amount approved for
each region if the funds have become a part of the stable patrimony of the public juridic
person,
(b) the withdrawal of funds from the stable patrimony of the public juridic person be-
yond the amount approved for each region,
(c) the disbursement of money or its equivalent (e.g., stocks, bonds, bank notes, certifi-
cates of deposit, and the like) beyond the amount approved for each region which was re-
ceived from the sale of property belonging to the stable patrimony of a public juridic person,
(d) the conveyance of money or its equivalent beyond the amount approved for each
region, accruing from pious foundations, Mass foundations, burses, endowments, annuities,
and the like, particularly if the obligations have not been acquitted,
(e) the conveyance of money or its equivalent, beyond the amount approved for each
region, which would be a diversion of stable patrimony from specific purposes for which it
was originally acquired.
3. Any act, beyond the amount approved for each region, with respect to Church property
which is part of the stable patrimony of a public juridic person and which is a preparation
for or anticipation of a potential conveyance, such as giving security, a mortgage, an option,
compromise, settlement.
4. In general, any act, beyond the amount approved for each region, with respect to Church
property which is part of the stable patrimony of a public juridic person by which such
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an actual conveyance of the fee interest in Church property, an alienation
Church property is subjected to burdens either in perpetuity or for a long time, such as
granting a use, or easement is of various kinds.
5. Any sale of precious works or notable relics.
There are quite a number of generic categories or actions which are not considered to
be acts of alienation for canon law purposes:
1. The spending of free capital. Under "free capital" we generally include ordinary in-
come and unrestricted movable gifts for operating expenses or capital improvements.
2. The transfer of property from one public juridic person to another public juridic
person, if both are part of the same general juridic person such as from a religious house to
a province or from a parish to a diocese.
3. The registering of assets under a new title such as separate incorporation of a school,
hospital, etc., but with the same canonical ownership. Only when the control of the assets on
the part of the public juridic person is transferred, diminished or endangered does the ques-
tion of alienation enter.
4. The assumption of a mortgage. If a benefactor gives to a public juridic person prop-
erty to which he held title, but which is heavily mortgaged, the acceptance of such property
does not come under the concept of alienation of Church property, since no Church funds
were invested in it.
5. The transfer of title in exchange for similar title. The exchange of securities for other
securities is generally not governed by the prescriptions on alienation. If title to real estate
is transferred, this is generally an alienation in the strict sense, unless the transfer were to
be for another piece of real estate of the same value. In such a case Church property would
not in most cases be considered to have been jeopardized.
6. The conversion of capital assets. The Sacred Congregation for Religion has often
held that the sale of real estate which is part of the stable patrimony of the institute and the
application of the proceeds to another capital purpose such as capital construction or reduc-
tion or liquidation of a mortgage on buildings or to a plant fund, does not constitute a
conveyance to which the canonical restrictions on alienation apply, but, rather, may be re-
garded simply as a conversion of capital assets from one form to another.
7. The use of Church property which is part of a public juridic person's free capital as
collateral for loans. Just as free capital may be expended without regard to the requirements
applicable to alienation, free capital may similarly be used as collateral. Likewise, if a juridic
person borrows or sells bonds to construct a new edifice, putting up only the title of the
edifice under construction as collateral, this is not the kind of encumbrance governed by
canonical restriction on alienation. Although the general issuing of bonds is frequently sub-
ject to the requirements applicable to alienation, some canonists also hold that when money
is borrowed merely on the general credit of the ecclesiastical corporation, without offering a
mortgage as security, this does not constitute alienation.
8. The making of a loan. Lending money is frequently a way of investing it. Lending
may be an act of extraordinary administration, but not be an alienation.
9. The sale of furniture. The sale of nonprecious furniture to replace it with furniture
of greater value or of equal value, is not generally considered an alienation.
10. An action in furtherance of the intent of those who have donated property to the
Church. Assets given for a specific purpose must be used for that purpose. The spending of
money, liquidating of securities or disposal or real estate for the purpose for which it was
given by the donors is not an act of alienation restricted by canon law. Thus, if a benefactor
willed or gave his home and grounds to further apostolic activities of a religious' community
without a requirement that the specific assets be retained, such assets may be sold and the
money used for the apostolic activities of these bodies.
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may exist when Church property is encumbered by a mortgage or other
security interest or through any transaction which places in jeopardy of
loss any interest in a public juridic person's property. However, the spe-
cial requirements for a legal alienation under canon law apply only to
Church property which is part of the stable patrimony of a public juridic
person. Therefore, even though many people use the term conveyance
and alienation interchangeably, the term alienation is both more encom-
passing and more narrow than the term conveyance.
While the law on administration is applicable to all Church property,
the restrictions with respect to alienation are applicable only to the stable
patrimony of the public juridic person. The concept of stable patrimony
is a relatively new concept introduced to answer the needs of our modern
economy which no longer rests prevalently on classes of property once
defined as immovable.9 The Code presupposes that every public juridic
person has a stable patrimony that can be made up of either movable or
immovable property. However, the Code does not specifically define "sta-
ble patrimony," but relies on continuing jurisprudence to refine the con-
cept. Without defining it, the law does provide that before property is to
be considered a part of the stable patrimony, it must be clear from a
legitimate ascription of the property to it. Even though undefined in the
Code, canonists generally agree that it would include property heretofore
classified as fixed capital. Stable patrimony would also include property
which has been donated to the Church through a vow or property which
is especially valuable due to its artistic or historical merit.
Without turning this paper into a discourse on the historical develop-
ment of property rights, in order to understand the concept of stable pat-
rimony, a view of history is essential. Canon law traces its roots to Roman
law and the Roman law developed from a pagan culture. In pagan Rome,
land was considered to be sacred, as it was a gift from the gods and had
been consecrated to the gods. Therefore, to sell real property was a seri-
ous and significant act. The pagans were fearful of challenging the gods.
As a result, Roman society developed strict rules pertaining to the sale of
11. Some canonists accept that in cases where the sound administration of a public
juridic person requires that it be unburdened of certain pieces of property that the require-
ments applicable to alienation are not mandatory, e.g., the conveyance of land which may no
longer be used for Church purposes, vacant land being heavily taxed, land creating ill will
toward the Church and its credibility with respect to social concerns, etc. Some canonists
also maintain that real property which is held as a business investment, and not as part of
the stable patrimony, may be freely transferred.
" Velasio de Paolis, C.S., Temporal Goods of the Church in the New Code with Particular
Reference to Institutes of Consecrated Life, 43 THE JURIST 343 (1983). The patrimony of an
institute includes more than its property. It is comprised of the intentions of the founders,
of all that the competent ecclesiastical authority has approved concerning the nature, pur-
pose, spirit and character of the institute, and of its sound traditions.
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real property. The Church adopted and reformed those cultural rules.
Church property was considered to be sacred as belonging to God. Rules
were developed to protect the Church by regulating the sale of Church
property. The concept of sacredness of property evolved throughout agra-
rian Europe as the Church became the official religion of Europe. The
doctrine of primogeniture is but one example-the family estate was not
to be sold but was to be preserved for future generations. In fact, it was
not to be divided among heirs, but was to pass intact to the eldest son.
Land became the symbol of power and wealth. This strict historic cul-
tural respect for real property accounts in a measure for the strict re-
quirement in canon law with respect to the alienation of real estate.
The economy of the world has changed. No longer is real property
the exclusive or even primary base of wealth, power or permanence, nor is
it viewed with the same reverance. There are many other ways that
wealth can be measured and be made productive. Because cultures and
traditions have changed, the law of the Church has also changed. No
longer is real property automatically considered to be part of the stable
patrimony. Church law may recognize that land is merely a business in-
vestment of the public juridic person.
Canon law sets forth three conditions that must be met for a varied
alienation. The first is that there must be a written estimate of the value
of the property being alienated from at least two experts. The second is
that the alienation must be for a just cause such as urgent necessity, evi-
dent practicality, piety, charity, or some other serious pastoral reason.
The just cause requirement would include aid to reallocate resources form
one apostolic activity to another or a need to borrow money to enlarge a
currently operating apostolate. The third is that the permission of the
competent authority is necessary. The administrator must not give per-
mission to alienate unless he or she is thoroughly informed about the fi-
nancial condition of the alienating entity, including information on its
previous alienations. Thus, for a religious institute, the superior general
must consult with his or her council members and/or with the institute's
finance council, in accordance with the institute's constitutions.
What constitutes competent authority will vary according to the cir-
cumstances. The National Conference of Bishops is required by the Code
to set a property value above which the permission of the Holy See would
be necessary for alienation. Alienations at or below that value are consid-
ered minor alienations for which the permission of the Holy See is not
required but for which permission of other competent authority would
still be necessary. In the United States, the value is currently at
$1,000,000.00. Alienation of Church property (other than property under
a vow or of particular merit) worth $1,000,000.00 or less does not require
approval of the Holy See. For such lesser valued property, the competent
authority will be determined by the nature of the public juridic person
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seeking to alienate the property. If the property to be alienated is divisi-
ble, the value of any previously alienated parts must be added to that of
the part currently being alienated in order to determine the threshold of
permission required. Thus, approval of the Holy See cannot be avoided
on the sale of stable patrimony worth more than $1,000,000.00 by inten-
tionally selling it in parcels. Alienation permissions obtained piecemeal
are held to be invalid.
For a diocese or public juridic person subject to the diocesan bishop,
such as a parish, the competent authority is the diocesan bishop with the
consent of the finance council, the college of consulters, and the parties
concerned. For public juridic persons who are not subject to the diocesan
bishop, such as a pontifical religious institute, the competent authority is
determined in the institute's own statutes. The law requires that for such
persons, competent authority shall at least include the appropriate supe-
rior with the consent of his/her council.
It should be noted that the Holy See's authority is also needed to
alienate vowed property, or property which has historic or artistic value.
Since the latter class of property would be rare in the United States, such
requirement has little practical application irrespective of the dollar value
thereof.
The law regulating the alienation of property is applicable to all
property which constitutes the stable patrimony of a public juridic per-
son. However, such law is only applicable to property which constitutes
the stable patrimony, not to all Church property. Property may become
part of the stable patrimony of a public juridic person through a specific
act of dedication by a competent authority of such juridic person, by do-
nation to such public juridic person under a vow or by simply being prop-
erty which is especially valuable due to its artistic or historical merit. The
restrictions applicable to alienation are not applicable to the free capital
of a public juridic person such as its business investments.
As we have seen, the real test of ownership or control under canon
law is accountability. That notion of accountability comes from the Ro-
man law concept of ownership. Under Roman law, title and use were indi-
visible. The property could only be accountable to one person, not to a
title owner and to a beneficial owner. Therefore, in order to determine
ownership/control under church law, the question that must be answered
is: is the entity accountable to a public juridic person? Is that accounta-
bility perfected by valid civil law methods? If there is no accountability,
it is not owned, supported, operated, controlled, or managed by the
Church. If there is no accountability, an organization might be "Catholic"
but not eligible for inclusion in the OCD.
But what does that mean to the diocesan bishop in his role as the
determiner of what entities get listed in the OCD? Does it mean that
hospitals, universities, etc., should not be included in the OCD? Does the
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bishop now have to abandon those religious institutes that took Vatican
II seriously and involved there laity in the apostolates? What about chari-
table and social action organizations that were founded by Catholic laity
in response to Apostolicam Actuositatem? Are not laity just as full mem-
bers of the Church as are clergy and religious? Does the bishop have to
abandon the laity who responded to the gospel call, the teaching of the
Church, and the movement of the spirit?
There is no doubt that the Church must recognize civil law and
render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar's; but in so doing must
the Church compromise its teaching or turn its back on the People of
God? Of course not. The bishops have an obligation to support the faith-
ful who are trying to live the gospel. That support can include the recog-
nition of the Catholic identity of organizations which are owned, oper-
ated, and controlled by Catholic laity without fear of government reprisal
if certain safeguards are met. We know from the language of the Pime
case that the Society of Jesus, a public juridic person, appoints one-third
of the members of the board. We know from Canon law that a public
juridic person acts in the name of the Church. We also know that the
university exists to provide education which, coincidentally, is also a
function of the Church. Because of that mutuality of function and be-
cause of the role of the Church in appointing certain trustees, the civil
law would recognize and accept that Loyola is "supervised or controlled
in connection with" the Church. By meeting that test, Loyola is eligible
for inclusion in the group revenue ruling and thus would be eligible for
inclusion in the OCD-even though the laity constitute a majority of the
trustees.
But what of a hospital, university, or similar organization that was
originally founded by a diocese or religious order but which has been
turned over to a completely lay board as was the case with St. Joseph's
Hospital? That too could still be eligible as being "operated in connection
with" the Church if there is a close and continuous working relationship
between the organization and the public juridic person. That relationship
could be established by a sponsorship agreement between the public ju-
ridic person and the institution. That agreement would necessarily incor-
porate the mission statement of both the public juridic person and the
entity and those mission statements would necessarily be mutual. It
would require a method of monitoring so as to assure that the institution
continues to be faithful to its mission statement and it would require that
the mission statement not be altered without the approval of the public
juridic person. The agreement would set forth the role of the Church that
the institution is meeting and it would set forth how the public juridic
person will influence the institution- either by providing board mem-
bers, members of administration, members of staff, etc.
With such an agreement the church can be faithful to its ecclesiology
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING, 1986
and to the pastoral theology of Vatican II and can still fulfill the require-
ments imposed by the Group Revenue Ruling issued by the United States
Treasury Department.
There is yet another way that the desired effect, inclusion in the
OCD, can be met when dealing with an apostolate which is owned, oper-
ated, and controlled by the laity but which still professes to be Catho-
lic. '0 The canons embodied in Book II, Title V, Association of the Chris-
tian Faithful, can be invoked. Such Associations are units which are
distinct from institutes of consecrated life and societies of apostolic life.
They may be composed entirely of laity. The purposes of such an associa-
tion include the exercise of apostolic works, the exercise of works of piety,
and the infusion of the temporal order with the Christian Spirit. Such an
association is either public10 ' or private. 0 2 The difference is that a public
association is erected by competent ecclesiastical authority,10 ' while a pri-
vate one is erected by its members but which is recognized by the
Church.'0 4 Such associations, even if private, can maintain the necessary
link with Church authority to be recognized as Catholic. 0 5 The property
of such an association would be used for charitable purposes because the
property must be administered in accordance with the by laws of the as-
sociation (which were approved by Church authority) subject to the vigi-
lance of Church authority. 0 6
Thus, the canon law does provide that an association of laity may
own, operate, and control a hospital or university which is an integral
part of the mission and ministry of the Catholic Church and which is just
as eligible for inclusion in the OCD as one which is owned, operated, and
controlled by a diocese or a religious institute. Such entities need only be
appropriately structured with civil law documents which also conform to
the requirements of canon law and be operated in the name of the
Church. 0 "7
It is evident, then, that canon law exists as a tool to enable the dioce-
san bishop to foster and promote lay involvement in the apostolate in
'00 It is not incongruous to call a hospital which is owned, operated and controlled by the
laity as an apostolate. Canon 225 provides that "[S]ince lay people, like all the Christian
faithful, are deputed to the Apostolate by baptism and confirmation, they are therefore
bound [emphasis added] by the general obligations. . . so that the divine message of salva-
tion maybe known and accepted by all people throughout the world." 1983 CODE c. 225.
101 1983 CODE c. 298.
102 Id. at c. 299.
Id. at c. 301.
' Id. at § 3; Canon 312, section 2 provides that competent authority could be the diocesan
bishop.
1 Id. at c. 299.
'0' Id. at cc. 215, 216, 299.
"' Id. at c. 305.
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keeping with ecclesiology and still conform to the requirements of civil
law with respect to tax exemption. While there is a tension between the
two legal disciplines, they do not exist in opposition to each other but
rather can be utilized together to protect the Church.'
108 The bishop should not approve an entity for inclusion and then assume that its by laws
and purposes remain the same forever. He should periodically review those entities for it
could be eligible for inclusion in one year but lose its qualification because of an amendment
to its corporate charter, to its operating philosophy, or by withdrawl of sponsorship. At a
minimum, the diocesan bishop should require an initial review by of the diocesan curia
before approving inclusion in the OCD. Thereafter, each listed entity should be required to
certify annually that there has been no change in status. Every three to five years there
should be an independent review by the curia. A proper application form which, if com-
pleted by the entity seeking to be listed, will help to expedite the review process. A copy of
a suggested form is attached. The diocesan bishop should also be aware that there is a
school of thought emanating from the USCC that the primary purpose of the OCD is to
serve as a vehicle for tax exemption rather than a reference book. That school would ex-
clude any entity which maintains its own § 501(c)(3) exempt status. Recently, the office of
the General Council of the USCC agreed with this author that such entities can be included
in the OCD if it is made clear that they are not included in the Group Revenue Ruling that
can be easily done with an asterisk.
